Blackwater Guilty Verdict Long Overdue by Carasik, Lauren
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Media Presence Faculty Publications
10-22-2014
Blackwater Guilty Verdict Long Overdue
Lauren Carasik
Western New England University School of Law, lcarasik@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/media
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Media Presence by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lauren Carasik, Blackwater Guilty Verdict Long Overdue, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 22, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/
opinions/2014/10/blackwater-guiltyverdictforiraqsnisoursquareshootings.html
Blackwater guilty verdict long overdue 
Despite convictions, accountability gaps remain for security contractors 
October 22, 2014 1:30AM ET 
by Lauren Carasik   @LCarasik 
Seven years after Blackwater contractors killed 14 unarmed Iraqi civilians and 
injured 17 others in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, a federal jury in the District of 
Columbia convicted one defendant of murder and three others of 
manslaughter and weapons charges for the bloodbath. The verdict was 
announced on Wednesday after 27 days of deliberation.  
The trial, which began June 11, served as an important test of U.S. willingness to 
hold its contractors to account. Blackwater was hired by the State Department to 
provide security for diplomats in Iraq. The carnage served as a flashpoint for Iraqi 
anger at Blackwater and sparked an international debate about the use of private 
security contractors.   
Iraqis’ demands for justice have been somewhat muted recently by their need for 
assistance in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But it is 
precisely the specter of increased U.S. engagement in Iraq and reluctance to put 
American military boots back on the ground that makes the gaps in accountability 
all the more urgent to fill. However, it is not simply the individual guards who 
should answer for this tragedy: Leaders of private security companies and the 
governments that employ them must also be held to account. 
Recklessness and hubris 
Most of the facts in this case are uncontested. On Sept. 16, 2007, the guards, 
positioned in four armored trucks, drove into Nisour Square. There they opened 
fire at a white Kia sedan driven by an unarmed Iraqi medical student and his 
mother, killing 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians. While the guards claim they believed 
they were being ambushed, there is little evidence to support their belief. 
The first of more than 60 witnesses to testify during the trial was Mohammed 
Kinani, whose 9-year-old son, Ali Abdul Razzaq, was killed as he sat in the 
backseat of his family’s car. Kinani recounted that day in harrowing detail. When 
the staccato of gunfire finally stopped, Kinani found his youngest son slumped 
sideways as his brains spilled to the ground between his shoes. After Ali died en 
route to the hospital, Kinani returned to the bloody scene to gather the rest of his 
son’s skull and brain tissue for burial. At one point during his testimony, Kinani 
was so grief-stricken that Judge Royce C. Lamberth recessed the trial until he 
could compose himself. The day after Kinani’s wrenching testimony, Lamberth 
excused a juror who said she was too haunted by Kinani’s story to sleep. 
Blackwater’s recklessness and hubris incited outrage among Iraqi civilians and 
the government. Appearing at a congressional hearing in 2007, Erik Prince, the 
company’s founder and former CEO, testified that his men “acted appropriately at 
all times.” But his assertions were belied by the company’s questionable tactics 
to defend its reputation and fend off threats to its ongoing business in Iraq. 
Former company officials claimed that in December 2007, Blackwater approved 
secret payments of $1 million to Iraqi officials, hoping to defuse criticism and 
evade accountability for the Nisour Square killings. Such payments are illegal 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribing foreign officials.  
The verdict against the Blackwater guards is a small and 
laudable step toward ending impunity. But the US must develop 
mechanisms to ensure accountability that ascends the chain of 
command in both private companies and the governments that 
hire them.  
Blackwater’s reputation was badly tarnished well before the Nisour Square 
tragedy. The New York Times wrote that “Blackwater had cultivated a cowboy 
culture that was contemptuous of government rules and regulations,” according 
to former company officials. Yet U.S. officials turned a blind eye to its misdeeds. 
A State Department investigation into Blackwater operations in Iraq was abruptly 
stopped in August, a few weeks prior to the shootings at Nisour Square. In 
a memo to officials on Aug. 31, chief investigator Jean Richter reported, 
“Blackwater contractors saw themselves as above the law.” He described a 
systematic lack of professionalism and discipline, compounded by superficial 
oversight of the contractors that created the perception that Blackwater issued 
rather than followed commands of the military. Richter reported that Daniel 
Carroll, Blackwater’s leader in Iraq, mentioned menacingly that “he could kill” 
him. But Richter’s warnings went unheeded. Despite its well-known misconduct, 
Blackwater was still able to obtain lucrative contracts in 2010 by designing a web 
of shell companies and subsidiary corporations.    
Prince sold the company, now known as Academi, four years ago. According to 
documents obtained by WikiLeaks, Prince had won $1.6 billion in unclassified 
federal contracts for the company in addition to payment for conducting classified 
work for the Central Intelligence Agency. And that is only a fraction of U.S. 
government expenditures for the security-industrial complex in the last seven 
years. The Department of Defense alone spent $160 billion on private security in 
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. At various points, private contractors 
outnumbered military personnel in Iraq. 
Oversight and accountability 
The lesson of the Nisour Square shootings is that privatizing military functions is 
inherently risky. For one, employees owe their allegiance to the firm, not the U.S. 
or the military policies it espouses. Despite their increased presence in 
conflicts and numerous instances of abuse, there are gaping holes in the civil 
and criminal accountability framework at the domestic and international levels. 
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), used to charge the 
Blackwater defendants, applies to Department of Defense missions and covers 
other U.S. agencies only “to the extent such employment relates to supporting 
the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.” But many 
perpetrators escape accountability for abuses, in part because of Washington’s 
reluctance to prosecute crimes. In July, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., continued his 
effort to expand liability by reintroducing the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act. The bill would extend the reach of criminal responsibility to those working for 
other U.S. agencies and require the administration to adequately resource efforts 
to investigate violations. But so far, Leahy’s efforts have been unsuccessful. 
Efforts are underway to fix the accountability gap at the international level as 
well, largely focused on industry self-regulation. In 2010 the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC) established standards that 
comport with human rights and humanitarian principles. The initiative relies on 
independent oversight to ensure compliance through a certification and 
monitoring process as well as a complaint mechanism. As of September 
2013, more than 700 companies have signed on to the standards. Critics note 
the ICOC is an agreement brokered by competing interests, including contractors 
arguing for the lowest standards and civil society advocates demanding more 
stringent safeguards, and that it is nonbinding and does not provide for remedies 
for the aggrieved. Nevertheless, the U.S. should contract only with companies 
that comply with the ICOC, to reinforce a normative framework of responsibility 
and encourage industrywide buy-in. 
But nonbinding initiatives are not enough. In 2010 the United Nations 
Mercenaries Working Group proposed a new convention more suitable for 
modern warfare and conflict zones. The treaty would explicitly cover private 
military and security contractors, promote transparency and accountability and 
ensure remedies for victims of grave human rights violations. Many countries 
support a legally binding international framework, but the lack of consensus on 
the need for a treaty dampens the likelihood of its adoption. Unsurprisingly, 
countries such as the U.S. that employ and are home to many of the private 
security companies are the most vocal opponents. 
The U.S. resists labeling its private military contractors mercenaries. But 
Washington is increasingly relying on paid private gunmen to provide critical 
services on the battleground and elsewhere, where the risk of lethal errors and 
the consequences of misconduct are high. Without clear laws, private soldiers 
will continue to operate in a legal vacuum. The verdict against the Blackwater 
guards is a small and laudable step toward ending impunity. But the U.S. must 
develop mechanisms to ensure accountability that ascends the chain of 
command in both private companies and the governments that hire them.  
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